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 Abstract 
 
In general, competition enhances efficiency. On the market for health insurance free 
market competition, however, has unwanted side-effects. The existence of asymmetrical 
information can lead to adverse selection and cream skimming. Adequate risk-
adjustment removes the incentives for cream skimming and balances the negative 
consequences of adverse selection. In an attempt to enhance efficiency, the Dutch 
government in 1992 introduced price competition between social health insurers in 
combination with risk-adjusted capitation payments. Our estimation results indicate that 
this has not resulted in altering market shares. Relatively cheap insurers did not enlarge 
their market share at the expense of their relatively expensive competitors.  
 
The introduction of competition among social health insurers has not been the success 
the Dutch government hoped for. Experiences  in Belgium and Germany show that the 
Dutch difficulties are not exceptional. When equity considerations are high valued 
features of a health insurance system, it is difficult to introduce competition. To enhance 
efficiency, we recommend that the current capitation formula should be refined and that 
the insurers should be given more room for selective contracting of health care 
providers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Efficiency is an important issue in health policy. Almost every country faces the 
problem of how to provide a high quality of health care at an affordable cost. This paper 
focuses on the introduction of price competition among Dutch social health insurers.  
 
The market for health insurance is no ordinary market. Free market competition is a 
mixed blessing because the existence of asymmetrical information can lead to adverse 
selection and cream skimming. Because health policy in the Netherlands is dominated 
by equity considerations, the introduction of competition has been accompanied by the 
introduction of risk-adjusted capitation payments. For the moment, Dutch policy 
measures have not evolved as the government expected. In order to see whether other 
countries are more successful, experiences with similar policy measures in Belgium and 
Germany are discussed in this paper. In Belgium and Germany, social health insurers 
also face incentives to operate more efficiently, while access to health insurance is 
preserved by means of risk-adjustment. As we will see later on, these countries are 
encountering similar difficulties to those in the Netherlands. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief summary of the most 
important theoretical considerations regarding competition among health insurers. In 
section 3 an overview of the Dutch health insurance system is presented. Section 4 
illustrates the central role the so-called sickness funds play in the Netherlands. The 
introduction of price competition in social health insurance is discussed in section 5. In 
section 6 an empirical analysis is presented. The situation in Belgium and Germany is 
examined in section 7. At the end of the paper the main findings are summarized. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
 
Until recently, competition in health care was not a commonly promoted policy in most 
countries. This changed when it became clear that central planning was not an optimal 
solution either. 
 
What are the advantages of competition? Generally speaking, in the absence of 
competition firms can take full advantage of their market power. Freedom of choice 
between competing firms allows customers to shop around and search for the best buy. 
While doing so, efficiency is promoted, product characteristics shift and new products 
are introduced to meet changing consumer demands. Yet, the market for health 
insurance is no ordinary market as the identity of the buyer (high versus low risk) can 
dramatically affect costs (Cutler & Zeckhauser, 1999). This can lead to adverse 
selection and cream skimming. 
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Adverse selection 
At premium rates reflecting average risks, insurance is an attractive offer only to those 
with higher risks. Only a few people with lower than average risks will take out the 
insurance policy. For them, the required rate is simply unattractive. In insurance 
economics, this phenomenon is called adverse selection (see for example Douma & 
Schreuder, 1991). The expected outcome of this scenario is that insurers will end up 
with a set of clients in which the higher risks are over-represented. Therefore, insurers 
will be forced to raise their premium rates. At these higher rates, insurance now 
becomes unattractive even to those with average risks. Eventually, adverse selection 
could become a self-reinforcing mechanism which would make it impossible to offer 
health insurance on the market. But even when health insurance markets do evolve in 
the presence of adverse selection, economic inefficiencies can result (Folland et al., 
1997). If the low-risk enrollees are grouped with the high-risk enrollees and everyone is 
charged the same premium, the lower risks tend to get underinsured and the higher risks 
tend to get overinsured. This can be prevented when premiums for insurance policies 
are based on the specific risk characteristics of each individual. However, it is widely 
believed to be unfair when people with certain unfavorable risk characteristics which 
they cannot influence are charged more. Therefore, risk sharing by means of 
compulsory insurance and uniform premiums are used as an instrument to eliminate the 
problems of adverse selection. By doing this, one must pay attention to the problem of 
moral hazard. This refers to actions which parties in a transaction may take after they 
have agreed to execute the transaction (Douma & Schreuder, 1991). If these actions are 
unobservable to the other party in the transaction, and if they may harm this other 
party’s interest, then these hidden actions may prevent the successful complementation 
of the transaction. In the case of health insurance, moral hazard refers to a situation in 
which the insured may start to behave with less caution, because he or she is insured. 
 
Cream skimming 
On the supply side of the market, insurers want to select so-called preferred risks. In 
economic literature, this is called cream skimming. When everyone is charged the same 
premium and insurers are able to identify several subgroups with different expected 
health care costs, it is profitable for insurers to distort their offerings. In such a situation, 
health insurers face incentives to identify and attract the lower risk people and deter the 
higher risk people from enrolling. The adverse effects of cream skimming are threefold 
(Van de Ven & Van Vliet, 1992). First, for higher risk people the access to health care 
is hindered. Second, it is possible that efficient insurers might be driven out of the 
market by inefficient insurers who are successful in cream skimming. Third, the costs of 
cream skimming can result in social welfare losses. In addition to these three effects, 
Cutler and Zeckhauser (1999) mention that even the quality of health care can be 
influenced by cream skimming. Improvements in the quality of health care are 
unattractive to insurers when they are expected to attract higher risk people. 
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Risk-adjusted capitation payments to health insurers 
Competition among health insurers can cause serious problems. Accessibility can 
decline as a result of adverse selection and cream skimming. High-risk groups may only 
be able to insure themselves at very high premium rates. In some cases premiums can 
even be unaffordable so that people will be uninsured. The main question about health 
insurance design is how to achieve the benefits of competition while containing the cost 
of adverse selection and cream skimming (Cutler & Zeckhauser, 1999). 
 
Risk-adjustment between health insurers provides a solution for this problem. Adequate 
risk-adjustment removes the incentives for cream skimming and balances the negative 
consequences of adverse selection. The most common possibility for the government 
would be to impose risk-adjusted capitation payments to health insurers (see Table 1). 
These payments should account for systematic variations in health care costs between 
different risk groups. By guaranteeing a fair distribution of funds, risk selection can be 
prevented. Risk-adjustment should lead to a situation in which the costs to insurers of 
selecting and attracting favorable risk groups outweigh the potential benefits (Schut, 
1995).  
 
Table 1: How does risk-adjustment work? 
 
 Systematic 
variation in health 
care costs 
Uniform and fixed 
premium (= equity)
Risk-adjustment 
payment 
Potential benefit of 
risk selection 
Low risk X X + ½C – ½C 0 
High risk X + C X + ½C + ½C 0 
Total 2X + C 2X + C 0 0 
 
Determination of an adequate health care budget for each insurer is nevertheless a major 
problem. In other words, what risk factors should be included in the capitation payment 
formula? Common factors such as age, sex and urbanization explain only a minor 
fraction of annual health care cost variability (Van de Ven & Van Vliet, 1992). More 
information on possible risk factors has to be collected because ‘‘…without an adequate 
risk-adjusted capitation system there will be no effective pressure from demand, in 
which case workable competition in health care will turn out to be an illusion’’ (Schut, 
1995, p. 80). Until an adequate capitation method is developed, it is possible to avoid 
some undesired side effects of competition by enforcing insurers to accept all 
applicants. This itself, however, does not remove the incentives for cream skimming. 
Health insurers will still be looking for alternative ways to attract the better risks. For 
example, health insurers can attract better risks through their marketing and promotion 
activities or through selective contracting of health providers according to their 
locations and reputations in particular specialties  
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Even if adverse selection and cream skimming can successfully be avoided through 
risk-adjustment and competition among health insurers can be introduced, this will not 
automatically lead to efficiency gains. Creating the correct financial incentives alone is 
not sufficient. Because health insurers provide service benefits, they have to arrange 
contracts with health providers (see Figure 1). Therefore it is important for health 
insurers to be able to contract health providers selectively. Only then they can enhance 
efficiency. When the provision of health care is strongly regulated – for example by 
means of fixed fees and centrally planned capacity – health insurers will not be able to 
influence their health care expenditures sufficiently and improve their efficiency, even if 
they face strong financial incentives to do so. 
 
Figure 1: The central role of health insurers 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The Dutch health insurance system2 
 
The Dutch health insurance system consists of three parts (see for example Ministry of 
Health, Welfare and Sports, 2000a). The first part covers serious long-term sicknesses 
or disorders that cannot easily be covered by private health insurance. This includes 
specialized facilities for the mentally and physically disabled, psychiatric care and home 
care. Insurance for this kind of risks is statutory and provided by the so-called 
Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ). Everyone is legally obliged to contribute 
to the AWBZ. These income-related contributions are part of the income tax system. 
The central government takes primary responsibility for this part of the insurance 
system, using budgetary controls, as well as strict planning of health care providers and 
regulation of premiums, co-payment schedules and coverage. 
 
The second part consists of two public schemes and a large number of private schemes 
covering basic medical services, including hospital care, pharmaceuticals and care 
provided by general practitioners and dentists. The first public scheme is the Health 
Insurance Act (ZFW). Insurance under this act is statutory for everyone who meets the 
criteria spelled out in the legislation. It is this part of the Dutch health insurance system 
on which we focus this paper. The other public scheme in the second part is called the 
Medical Insurance Access Act (WTZ). In 1986 the government decided to abolish the 
voluntary and elderly people’s ZFW insurance schemes. As a result of this, several 
categories of people who had previously been covered by these forms of insurance had 
to buy private health care insurance. In order to guarantee access to this type of 
                                                           
2 See for an extensive – though on some points a bit outdated – description of the total 
Dutch health care system Schrijvers (ed. 1997). 
Patient Health insurer Health providers 
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insurance, the private health care insurers were obliged to incorporate a certain 
insurance (the WTZ standard insurance) in their portfolios. There are a number of 
statutory rules that apply to this insurance in relation to acceptance of insured people, 
the magnitude of the risk to be insured and the contribution to be charged for it. Those 
who do not meet the criteria for joining ZFW insurance or the WTZ scheme can seek 
insurance on the private market. In the private market, premiums, co-payment schedules 
and coverage are not regulated by the government. 
 
Additional medical services – not covered by ZFW insurance and basic private 
insurance – can be insured privately. In this third part of the health insurance system 
premiums and co-payments rates are not regulated and are therefore allowed to differ 
across insurers and risk classes. 
 
Figure 2: Type of health insurance in the Netherlands (1999, % population) 
Source: CBS (2000). 
 
Traditionally, health policy in the Netherlands is dominated by equity concerns. This is 
reflected in the health insurance system. First, the Dutch government uses the health 
insurance system to redistribute income (Westerhout, 1999). For example, the two 
largest public insurance schemes (AWBZ and ZFW) are almost entirely financed by 
income-related premiums and taxes. Second, social health insurance premiums are not 
allowed to differ between risk classes. Only within the private market do premiums 
depend on risk factors. But in the private market for health insurance, the government 
has introduced separate schemes with mandatory cross-subsidization in order to 
safeguard access for certain high-risk groups of insured who do not meet the criteria for 
social insurance. Therefore, every Dutch citizen is able to buy health insurance. The 
result is that – although insurance is not mandatory for more than one-third of the 
Private
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population – approximately only one percent of the Dutch population is uninsured (see 
Figure 2). 
 
4. ZFW insurance 
 
In this paper we focus on the market for ZFW insurance. More than 60 percent of the 
Dutch population is subject to this compulsory type of health insurance. ZFW insurance 
is administered by independent private non-profit organizations called sickness funds 
(‘ziekenfondsen’). As a consequence, these insurers play an important role in financing 
Dutch health care expenditure (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Financing Dutch health care expenditure (2001, % total) 
Source: Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports (2000b). 
 
Premiums 
The ZFW insured pay an income-related contribution (basic premium) and a flat rate fee 
(supplementary premium). The basic premium rate is uniform and fixed by the 
government. Basic premiums are collected by a central fund which gives the individual 
funds a yearly budget. The total budget of this central fund for the year 2001 is made up 
of basic premium revenues (72 percent), government contributions (24 percent) and 
payments from private insurers (3 percent). Since most elderly are ZFW insured 
(leading to relative high health care expenditures when compared to private health 
insurers), these latter payments compensate the sickness funds for this.3 
                                                          
3 Based on the so-called Joint Funding of Older People Insured by the Health Insurance 
Funds Act (MOOZ). 
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In contrast to the basic premium, supplementary (non-income related) premiums are set 
by the individual funds as a fixed amount of money per person. This flat rate fee is 
based on the number of adults covered, but is not allowed to differ between income and 
risk classes. All enrollees pay this supplementary premium directly to their own insurer. 
Because supplementary premiums are allowed to differ between the sickness funds, 
price competition can arise (this will be discussed in section 5). For the moment 
substantial co-payments do not exist in ZFW insurance. Because health providers 
receive their fees by means of third party payments, there is no direct financial 
relationship between people with ZFW insurance and their health care providers. Figure 
4 presents an overview of this financial system. 
 
Figure 4: Sickness funds and ZFW insurance 
 
 
Benefit package 
Just like the basic premium, the benefit package is set by the government and is not 
allowed to differ between individual sickness funds. As mentioned earlier, ZFW 
insurance generally covers routine non-catastrophic care. The exact composition of the 
benefit package differs from year to year. Continuing political discussions between 
those who favor a broad package and those who want to restrict the coverage are the 
main reason for these fluctuations. Cost containment and equity issues also play an 
important role. 
 
Call for change 
For several reasons, there is discussion in the Netherlands about modernization of ZFW 
insurance. First, policymakers want to improve efficiency in order to decrease the costs 
of this public insurance scheme, especially because in the future the aging of the Dutch 
population is expected to result in additional increases of public medical expenditure. A 
second reason is that patients increasingly desire medical care that is designed to meet 
their individual needs and demands. In other words, they claim more freedom of choice 
than a central planned system can offer. This call for change has resulted in the 
Central fund
Enrollees
Health providersSickness fundsBasic premium
Budget
Supplementary premium
Payments
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introduction of competition among sickness funds along with the introduction of a risk-
adjusted capitation system. 
 
5. Competing sickness funds 
 
In 1992, legal barriers preventing competition among Dutch sickness funds were 
dismantled. First, the legally protected regional boundaries of the funds were 
eliminated. Prior to 1992, people eligible for ZFW insurance could not choose between 
sickness funds. In most cases they were automatically assigned to the regional fund. 
Each fund was obliged to operate within its legally defined territory. This implied that 
they were only able to contract health care providers established in their assigned 
region. Now all funds can operate nationwide and ZFW insured are free to choose any 
fund they want. Second, room for price competition among the sickness funds was 
created. Funds must now charge a flat rate premium which they can use as a 
competitive instrument. Third, entrance to the market for ZFW insurance is allowed. 
Private health insurers are permitted to establish sickness funds as separate legal 
entities. A separated legal entity is required because sickness funds and private insurers 
operate on separate markets. For people with private health insurance it is prohibited to 
buy insurance from a sickness fund. 
 
Freedom of choice allows people with ZFW insurance to choose the fund that is best for 
them. They can switch from one fund to another once a year. To avoid the unwanted 
side-effects of competition among sickness funds, the funds must accept all people who 
are eligible for ZFW insurance. Ex post, choice is balanced by risk-adjustment 
provisions.  
 
Risk-adjustment provisions 
As mentioned before, income-related premiums are collected by a central fund that 
allocates a budget to each individual fund. Prior to 1991, sickness funds were ex post 
fully reimbursed for their total health care expenditure. Sickness funds now receive a 
yearly budget that should cover their expenses, although not completely. Any shortfalls 
must be covered by the supplementary premium that they bill and receive directly from 
their members. The introduction of competition and prospective budgeting made it 
necessary to apply risk-adjusted capitation payments. When budgets are based on 
adequate risk characteristics, the incentives for cream skimming are removed. In 
practice however, some imperfections in the budget formula will always exist. 
 
Annually, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports determines the maximum allowed 
total ZFW-expenditure. After this, the Ministry determines the required level of the 
supplementary premium that the funds at least must charge to balance their budget. By 
subtracting the expected revenue of this required supplementary premium from the 
maximum allowed total ZFW expenditure, the government knows the national budget 
that it has to allocate to the different sickness funds. The income-related premium is 
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then set at such a level that the revenues cover this budget. For the level of the income-
related premium the Ministry is advised by the Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ). 
 
The total budget sickness funds receive, consists of four different parts (Staatscourant 
1999).4 The funds receive a budget for (1) fixed hospital costs, (2) variable hospital 
costs, (3) costs of medical specialists and (4) outpatient care (including pharmaceuticals 
and medical devices). These prospective budgets are based on a combination of risk 
factors and historical costs. The risk factors currently used are age, sex, urbanization 
and socio-economic status. Since the funds cannot be held fully responsible for all costs, 
sickness funds are compensated by the following provisions: 
- The budget formula is complemented by a system of excess loss compensation. 
Concerning variable hospital costs and outpatient care, the sickness funds are 
compensated for almost all expenditures above the amount of € 4,537 for an 
individual insured. 
- Sickness funds are compensated for the fact that they are unable to influence all 
costs they incur. They are (partly) reimbursed for expenditures outside their control. 
Most important in this context are hospital services and services of medical 
specialists. 
 
Table 2 presents an overview of the Dutch risk-adjusted capitation system for the year 
2000. In comparison with earlier years the financial risks for sickness funds are 
enlarged, but not yet very impressive.  
 
Table 2: The Dutch risk-adjusted capitation system 
 
 Prospective budget allocation Retrospective adjustments 
 % on historical costs % on risk factors % shortfall reimbursed 
1. Fixed hospital costs 100% 0% 95% 
2. Variable hospital costsa 30% 70% 25% 
3. Costs of medical specialists 0% 100% 95% 
4. Outpatient carea 30% 70% 0% 
a. Excess loss compensation compensates the funds when these expenditures exceed the 
amount of € 4,537 for an individual insured. 
Source: Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports (2000a) and Staatscourant (1999). 
 
6. Empirical analysis 
 
In this section we analyze the market for ZFW insurance empirically. It is claimed that 
most Dutch sickness funds compete with each other on a national market since 1992 
(see for example Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports, 1998). Because there are no 
differences in benefit package, this would imply that relatively expensive insurers lose 
                                                          
4 The following information reflects the situation as in the year 2000. 
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enrollees to their relatively cheap competitors. Before we test this hypothesis, we first 
look at the market concentration to get an indication of the room for competition. After 
that we look at the development of the supplementary premiums which are used as an 
instrument of competition. At the end of this section we examine whether the 
introduction of price competition has affected market shares. 
 
Market concentration 
The smaller the number of firms, the more concentrated a market is. Although there is 
no deterministic link between the level of concentration and competition intensity, the 
argument that a higher level of concentration leads to a less competitively market is 
widely accepted (George et al., 1991, p. 133). In order to say something meaningful 
about the number of firms and their market shares, many different statistical measures 
are available. The concentration ratio is the most widely used indicator. It simply gives 
the sum of the shares of the largest firms and is an easily computable and interpretable 
indicator of the competition intensity. 
 
Figure 5: Concentration ratio Dutch sickness funds 
Source: own calculations based on figures from CVZ. 
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Despite the growing number of sickness funds since 1993, the market is now more 
concentrated (see Figure 5). This higher degree of concentration is the result of mergers 
between existing sickness funds. Although concentration has increased the last couple 
of years, it seems there is still enough room for competition. No sickness fund has such 
a large share of the market that it can be called a dominant fund on beforehand (see 
Table 3). Additionally, the removal of legal entry barriers resulted in the entrance of 
new sickness funds. 
 
Table 3: The market for ZFW insurance 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total number of funds 25 25 26 27 29 29 29 
New entrants 0 0 2 1 2 2 0 
Market share largest fund 11.8% 11.7% 11.8% 11.8% 12.1% 12.3% 12.4% 
C3-ratioa 25.4% 25.3% 29.9% 30.0% 30.2% 32.5% 32.5% 
C5-ratiob 37.8% 37.7% 42.1% 42.0% 41.9% 44.7% 44.7% 
a. Sum of the shares of the three largest sickness funds. 
b. Sum of the shares of the five largest sickness funds. 
Source: own calculations based on figures from CVZ. 
 
Supplementary premiums 
Since the introduction of price competition in 1992, supplementary premiums have been 
allowed to vary among the different sickness funds. From 1993 until 1995, however, all 
funds (except one) charged the same premium. This situation came to an end in 1996. 
From that year on the variability of the premiums became greater (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Supplementary premiums (€ per year)a 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Highest premium 89.85 89.85 89.85 163.91 108.36 108.36 200.12 
Lowest premium 87.13 87.13 87.13 147.57 65.34 65.34 156.55 
Difference 2.72 2.72 2.72 16.34 43.02 43.02 43.56 
Unweighted average  89.63 89.63 89.74 155.70 98.20 97.88 178.96 
Standard deviation  0.75 0.75 0.53 3.74 7.78 8.36 12.61 
Coefficient of variation 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.07 
a. Due to differences in benefit package and co-payment rates, the absolute level of the 
premiums can differentiate considerably between the years. 
Source: own calculations based on figures from CVZ. 
 
Figure 6 shows the gap between the highest and the lowest premium in the market. 
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Figure 6: Supplementary premiums 
Source: own calculations based on figures from CVZ. 
 
Relationship between market share and supplementary premium? 
In case of effective price competition, a clear relationship is expected between 
supplementary premium and market share. Relatively cheap sickness funds then enlarge 
their market share at the expense of relatively expensive funds. We assess the impact of 
price competition by estimating an equation relating market share (M) to supplementary 
premium (P). The variable P acts as a proxy for each fund's competitiveness, because 
supplementary premiums are divided by the sample mean for each year. When P is 
larger than one the sickness fund in question is relatively expensive, when P is smaller 
than one it is relatively cheap. To test the hypothesis that market shares are influenced 
by supplementary premiums, we use panel data for 23 sickness funds over the period 
1996-1999, covering more than 80 percent of the market. Because omitted variables 
may lead to changes in the cross-section intercepts we do not use the least-squares 
pooling procedure. Instead, we introduce dummy variables that allow the intercept term 
to vary over cross-section units. This fixed-effects model can be written as 
 
itttitit WWPM εγγβα +++++= 232322 ...  
 
where Mit is the market share of sickness fund i in year t. Wit is a dummy variable and 
has the value one for sickness fund i (i = 2,…,23) in year t (t = 1996,…,1999) and zero 
otherwise. The estimation results are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Estimation resultsa 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Probability 
Pit -0.0034 0.0025 -1.38 0.17 
R2 = 0.9993b 
a. The estimated fixed-effects are not presented here, but are available on request. 
b. Any variation in Mit is almost completely explained by the fixed effects. 
 
Based on these results, the hypothesis that market shares are influenced by 
supplementary premiums is rejected at a five percent significance level. In other words, 
for the given time period, market shares were not affected by fluctuations in 
supplementary premiums. Our estimation results are in line with the findings of Hassink 
(1998) and Schut (2001). Only Kalshoven (1999) concludes that price competition 
among Dutch sickness funds has an effect on the number of insured. 
 
The introduction of price competition among Dutch sickness funds in 1992 has not 
resulted in altering market shares. To our opinion four possible explanations can be 
mentioned. First, differences in supplementary premiums are currently small when 
expressed as a percentage of total premium payments. When a member of the most 
expensive fund switches to the cheapest one, this person saves at most 3 percent of its 
total premium payments (based on a taxable income of € 20,000).5 
 
Second, sickness funds posses regional market power. Until 1992 the sickness funds 
operated on a regional level. On historical grounds each fund is located in a region in 
which they often have more than 60 percent market share. Mergers between 
neighboring sickness funds have strengthened this regional market power even further 
(Schut, 1995). Even though it seems that there is enough room for competition on a 
national market, it is possible that remaining regional structures will prevent this from 
happening. Most sickness funds only have attractive contracts with health providers 
established in their own region. Thus, a relatively cheap sickness fund in region A is not 
necessarily a good alternative for people who live in region B. As a result, price 
differences will not always lead to altering market shares. Additionally, most individual 
separately budgeted sickness funds in practice operate as members of the same holding 
company. This makes that Table 3 underestimates actual market shares. Recent 
calculations made by Van den Brink (2001), suggest that 71 percent of all ZFW 
enrollees is insured at one of the five biggest holding companies.  
 
                                                           
5 In a recent article Schut and Laske-Aldershof (2001) argue that most people do not look 
at their total premium payments, but at their supplementary premium payments. When 
this is the case, differences look bigger. A member of the most expensive fund can then 
save at most 40 percent. 
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Third, the obligation for the funds to accept all people who apply for ZFW insurance 
does not count for supplementary insurance contracts. So it is possible that a person 
who wants to leave a relatively expensive sickness fund, is not able to buy his or her 
desired insurance package (ZFW + supplementary) somewhere else. As supplementary 
insurance is  important for most people (especially for those with chronic illnesses), 
freedom of choice is restricted (Schut, 2001).  
 
Fourth, switching costs can give sickness funds a degree of market power over their 
current enrollees (see for example Klemperer, 1995). For example, there may be high 
transaction costs which make it costly to switch health insurance. Uncertainty about the 
quality of other sickness funds can also make that people stay at their current insurer, 
even when they know there are cheaper alternatives.  
 
7. The experiences in Belgium and Germany 
 
The previous section shows that Dutch policy measures have not evolved as the 
government expected. In order to see whether other countries are more successful in 
introducing competition among social health insurers, we now discuss the relevant 
experiences in Belgium and Germany. The health insurance system in Belgium and 
Germany is comparable with the Dutch health insurance system. In both countries, a 
large part of the population has compulsory insurance within the social insurance 
system which is administered by non-profit sickness funds. Furthermore, equity and 
universal access to medical care are prominent values.  
 
Belgium 
Belgium has a compulsory national health insurance plan covering major health risks 
(including inpatient and long-term care) for the entire population and minor risks 
(including outpatient care) for nearly 90 percent of the population. The Belgian 
compulsory scheme includes both health insurance coverage and income support in the 
event of illness and is administered by five private non-profit organizations called 
mutual aid funds (‘mutualiteiten’) and one public fund. The latter is for those who 
refuse to join a sickness fund or who neglect to do so. The five mutual aid funds 
comprise a total of about hundred local insurers – the sickness funds – differing in size 
from a minimum of about 400 enrollees to a maximum of about 450,000. In addition to 
compulsory health insurance, the sickness funds offer supplementary insurance to cover 
services not provided under the system of social health insurance and voluntary 
insurance. Due to the almost nation-wide coverage of the social health insurance 
scheme, few opportunities are left for private health insurance companies. Therefore, in 
terms of market volume, private health insurance is small in Belgium (Van Kemenade, 
1997). 
 
The financial system of the Belgian compulsory health insurance strongly resembles the 
Dutch system. The various sickness funds receive a yearly budget from a central fund. 
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This central fund is financed by income-related premiums and government 
contributions. The income-related premium rate is set by the government and is not 
allowed to differ among the funds. In addition, the compulsory insured also have to pay 
a extremely small flat rate premium of about € 2.50 a year to their sickness fund 
(Schokkaert & Van de Voorde, 2000). Furthermore, Belgium has an extended system of 
co-payments with rates generally differing from 25 to 30 percent.  
 
In contrast to earlier years, the global budget of social health insurance is now 
determined before actual expenditure is known. The budget each sickness fund receives 
from the central fund is a weighted combination of risk-adjusted capitation provisions 
and the expected actual expenditures for the year in question (Kesenne & Diels, 1996). 
The risk-adjusted payments are intended to avoid cream skimming as much as possible. 
In contrast with countries like the Netherlands and Germany, the Belgian government 
ruled out the option of using simple risk adjustment schemes. In 1994 a long list of 
possible risk factors was specified. Besides factors like age, sex and family structure, 
this list also includes for example income, morbidity-related characteristics and regional 
factors such as indicators of urbanization. However, the current capitation formula still 
explains only a small fraction of the variation of medical expenditures. 
 
When calculating the funds’ yearly budget the greatest weight is given to actual 
expenses. Currently 30 percent of the budget is based on prospective risk-adjusted 
capitation payments. After the year 2002, this will be increased to a maximum of 40 
percent. Although the budget of each sickness fund is largely based on its actual 
expenditures, it is important to note that the reimbursement of all funds together can not 
exceed the national budgetary objective. Therefore, its share in the total health 
expenditures of all funds collectively determines the exact reimbursement of actual 
expenditures for each fund. To contain costs and increase efficiency, the Belgian 
government has put the funds at a financial risk. Each sickness fund is currently 
responsible for 25 percent of its possible shortfall. The other 75 percent is borne by 
inter-mutual solidarity: deficits of some funds are covered out of the surpluses of other 
sickness funds.  
 
Despite the recent reform of 1993, Schokkaert and Van de Voorde (2000) argue that 
Belgium has not really taken the step towards stronger competition. Competition is very 
limited, because the offered benefit package, contribution rates and fee schedule on 
which reimbursement to patients is based are all determined by law and the impact of 
any variation in supplementary premiums is nil. Furthermore, it is mentioned that the 
market for compulsory health insurance is not only strongly concentrated, but also 
closed and non-contestable (Nonneman & Doorslaer, 1994). Competition among 
Belgian sickness funds is therefore restricted to the quality of service delivery – such as 
the speed of settling claims – and supplementary insurance. The lack of competition is 
also expressed in the fact that selective contracting is still not allowed in Belgium. 
Currently, sickness funds negotiate as a cartel with health care providers. As a result, 
 22 
individual sickness funds do not have the adequate instruments to influence their own 
expenditures and contain costs. 
 
Germany 
In Germany about 88 percent of the population is enrolled in Statutory Health Insurance 
(GKV). Approximately 14 percent of these enrollees are voluntary members who are 
also entitled to change over to private health insurance. Enrollment in GKV insurance is 
compulsory for employees who earn a gross income below a certain threshold and for 
some special groups (like retirees, farmers and students). The German statutory scheme 
is administered by non-profit sickness funds (‘Krankenkassen’). The majority of the 
funds’ revenues originates from income-related premiums, which the insured pay 
directly to their sickness funds. Since each individual sickness fund must cover its 
expenses with its own payroll contributions, premiums among sickness funds can 
differentiate. Premiums however, must be set within a framework – that is between a 
minimum and maximum rate – which is determined by the federal government. In 
accordance with the wide-accepted principle of equity, the sickness fund premium for 
any given fund is the same for all members, regardless of their personal characteristics. 
The sickness funds are required by law to offer a minimum benefit package and the 
insured have to pay co-payments for certain health care services, such as 
pharmaceuticals, dentures and hospital stays. Unlike private insurance companies, 
sickness funds are not allowed to provide supplementary insurance. 
 
As in the Netherlands and Belgium, the German government also faces serious pressure 
to contain costs and increase the efficiency of their public health insurance system. The 
Health Care Structure Act (1992) encompassed the reinforcement of competition. Some 
competition among sickness funds already existed, but freedom of choice was limited. 
This led to serious distortions as higher risks and lower incomes were overrepresented 
in certain funds. As a consequence, a substantial gap between the highest and lowest 
payroll contribution rates existed and this undermined the principle of equity. For that 
reason, the German government decided to reform the health insurance system in the 
early nineties. Under the new legislation almost every enrollee – including the 
compulsory insured – has the opportunity to switch from one sickness fund to another 
once a year. The most remarkable result of the intensified competition among sickness 
funds in Germany is a strong reduction in the number of sickness funds, from 1,221 in 
1993 to 453 in 1999 (Brown & Amelung, 1999). 
 
To avoid adverse selection and cream skimming in a competitive market, the German 
federal government established a risk compensation pool. In this way, differences 
among the sickness funds caused by factors outside their control had to be removed by 
means of risk-adjusted capitation payments. As a result the competitive position of the 
sickness funds was being equalized as much as possible (Greiner & Graf von der 
Schulenburg, 1997). The current risk-adjustment parameters are age, sex, income and 
family structure. The subsidies to funds with an unfavorable risk-structure are paid 
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prospectively, without regard to actual costs and the ex post financial situation of the 
fund. An important consequence of this risk adjustment is that the premium differences 
between funds decline. For example, the premium of a relatively rich sickness fund with 
a lower-risk clientele will rise in order to generate the extra resources needed to 
subsidize funds with a relatively poor, higher-risk clientele. 
 
The German Health Reform was intended to provide sickness funds with incentives to 
reduce costs and increase service quality, while preserving accessibility. However, the 
new statute has not had the effects policymakers hoped for. A few reasons for this can 
be mentioned (Files & Murray, 1995; Brown & Amelung, 1999). First, competition is 
still limited. Benefits are determined by the federal government and selective 
contracting of health care providers is prohibited. Second, some argue that the risk-
adjusted capitation scheme has removed much of the premium differences that made 
some funds more competitive than others. Third, the current four risk-adjusted 
parameters – age, sex, income and family structure – are too crude to avoid cream 
skimming. Although sickness funds are compelled to accept everyone who wants to 
enroll, they might use marketing as an instrument for favorable risk selection. Another 
concern is that only high-income employees are allowed to buy health insurance on the 
private market. Funds are worried that the premium differences by which the lower 
risks subsidize the higher ones may drive the former into private insurance plans. This 
can eventually reduce the funding base of the equity principle. 
 
Three countries facing similar problems 
To improve efficiency Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands have introduced 
competition among social health insurers accompanied by the introduction of risk-
adjusted capitation payments in the early nineties (see Table 6). However, since equity 
considerations play an important role in social health insurance, competition is limited. 
In all three countries benefit package is not allowed to differ and premium differences 
are small (the Netherlands) or even nil (Belgium). Germany has the best opportunities 
for price competition, since in that country social health insurers can set their total 
premium independently. Although it is said that risk-adjustment reduces the possibilities 
to use premiums as a competitive tool, the number of Germans who leave one fund and 
join another is increasing. Most of these people mention lower contributions as the 
prime motive (European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 2000). 
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Table 6: Competition among social health insurers 
 
 Belgium Germany Netherlands 
Competition on: 
- benefit package? 
- income-related premium? 
- flat rate fee? 
- supplementary insurance? 
 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
- 
no 
 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
Risk-adjustment: 
- prospective capitation payments?
- retrospective adjustments? 
 
yes 
yes 
 
yes 
no 
 
yes 
yes 
Selective contracting allowed? no no yesa 
a. But hampered in practice because of fixed fees and central planning. 
 
In Germany the financial responsibility for sickness funds seems larger than in Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Where in the latter two countries prospectively allocated budgets 
are retrospectively adjusted, the German sickness funds are only ex ante compensated 
for their risk structure by a risk compensation pool. Thus, the German funds have to 
balance their expenses completely with their premium revenues and the compensation 
payments they receive. However, because selective contracting is not allowed in 
Germany, the funds are not able to influence all the costs they incur in order to enhance 
efficiency. The same is true for Belgium, but the financial risks for the Belgian sickness 
funds are much more limited. Only in the Netherlands selective contracting is allowed. 
However, this is hampered in practice because of fixed fees and central planning. 
Additionally, the existence of asymmetric information contributes to a dominant 
position of health providers. This may require sickness funds with market shares to be 
close to regional monopolies, which limits the room for competition even more. 
 
This section shows that the Dutch problems in social health insurance reform are not 
exceptional. Although Belgian and German policies are different on some points, these 
countries encounter the same difficulties as the Netherlands do. So it can be concluded 
that they all face the same challenge for the future: how to create the right competitive 
environment for sickness funds with adequate financial incentives? Until now, it can be 
said that neither Belgium, Germany nor the Netherlands have found the ultimate 
solution to this problem. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
It is very difficult to implement competition among health insurers when equity 
considerations are highly valued features, because free market competition can lead to 
adverse selection and cream skimming. To avoid these problems risk-adjusted 
capitation payments are used, but these can not (yet) sufficiently predict individual 
health care expenditure. Both Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands have therefore 
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not yet created the right competitive environment with adequate financial incentives. 
The current budget method for sickness funds needs to be refined. Only prospective 
budgeting with the use of a better capitation formula can create stronger financial 
incentives for the sickness funds to operate efficiently. In addition to this, it is necessary 
to give the sickness funds more room for selective contracting of health providers. 
Central planning and regulation of health care services must therefore be relaxed. 
 
It seems that the introduction of competition among social health insurers has not been 
effective. Our estimation results indicate that during the period 1996-1999 in the 
Netherlands no significant relationship existed between supplementary premiums and 
market shares. It seems that expensive and possibly more inefficient insurers did not 
lose customers to their competitors. Possible explanations are the small differences in 
supplementary premiums, regional market power, restricted freedom of choice and 
switching costs. 
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